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Wissenschaftskolleg zu BerHn 
Attestment of payment was obstructed by the sellers of a garden outside 
Cordoba in a case presented to the market inspector Ibn Hans some thirty years 
later. A garden in the suburb Hawânît al-Rïhânî in the quarter Masgid Aslam had 
been sold in Ramadan 457 (August 1065) for 240 Carmonian gold mitqàl, of 
which the buyer had already paid 95 mitqal upon the signing of the contract.^ ^^ 
The buyer 'Abd al-'Azïz allegedly had also paid the rest due and accused the 
sellers, 'Abd Allah and Muhammad b. Hud, of impeding testimony to this for 
fear that he might claim for damages. Both sellers were summoned to the market 
inspector, and, after several admonitions by the judge, one brother acknowledged 
receipt of the price, which the other had never denied. Then the buyer made a 
claim for damages on behalf of the rotten and mildewy trees in the garden, 
substantiating it with testimonial evidence. Both sellers, however, objected and, 
within the time limit set by the judge, presented four witnesses backing their 
counter-claim. These witnesses attested, in slightly variant manners, that they 
had heard the buyer say that if the sellers acknowledged collecting the price, he 
would refrain from claiming damages for the rotten and mildewy trees. In 
juridical terms, this constituted evidence of agreement to renounce court action, 
an agreement the buyer had broken. The legal problem for the jurists was how to 
weigh the claim for damages on the one hand and the preceding renunciation of 
it on the other. Ibn ' Attâb and Ibn al-Qattán concluded that the claim of damages 
nevertheless had to be accepted. According to Ibn 'Attáb, this might lead to a 
return of the garden. That one of the sellers had denied receiving the price 
excused the renouncement of court action, but the buyer had to swear that the 
denial was the only reason for the testimony against him. According to Ibn al-
Qattan, testimony of the renouncement did not invalidate the claim for damages, 
but touched aspects not to be dealt with in the fatwà. Ibn Malik, on the other 
hand, refused to give a fatwà because he objected to the dishonest conduct of 
both sides.^ ^° 
•69 Ibn Sahl,A/ïi^m, 577-9. 
•70 Ibid. 
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With this last case, we come to the cases of recovering damages, not all of 
which were presented to the market inspector.'^' Hubur had bought a house {dàr) 
in the old city of Cordoba in the quarter Masgid ' Abadil for 280 Carmonian gold 
mitqàl, of which the seller Fátima had already received 80 mitqàl. Although 
Fâtima had indicated some defects of the house prior to the sale, such as «old 
walls» and «unstable fundaments», as a reason for a reduced price, Hubur later 
claimed for a substantial price reduction on the grounds that the outer walls of 
the building were about to collapse. Asked in court, she asserted that she had 
seen the cracks in the walls and freed the seller Fâtima from recompense. This 
kind of «dismissal» (ta'affa) was the only way to sell a defective building 
without having to fear later claims by the buyer. Fâtima acknowledged the 
contract of sale, but objected to Hubùr's claim. As a consequence, Hubur was 
obhged to have it confirmed. And two witnesses attested to the nearly collapsing 
walls full of cracks, which had already existed prior to the sale but could be seen 
only from outside and therefore must have escaped the buyer's attention. Such 
damage reduces the price substantially. Their on-site testimony of the estate 
(hiyàza) was later certified in the market inspector's court. Fâtima's legal agent, 
however, objected and, within those periods set to him subsequently by the judge 
as part of legal procedure, presented a contradicting testimonial document. This 
testimony, accepted by the market inspector as evidence in court, attested that the 
damages claimed by Hubur did not exist: the wall was still balanced and not 
about to collapse and its cracks were not obvious although, the witnesses 
admitted, you could see them on a closer look.^ ^^ 
In this situation of two contradicting testimonies, Ibn 'Attâb advised the judge 
to visit the place himself in the presence of building experts of integrity, who 
should inspect the building inside and outside. This was done, and the experts 
found not only cracks, a shabby appearance and an east wall endangered by 
collapse, but also that the walls had become pervaded by salt, which however was 
only recognizable to experts. These defects allowed for a substantial decrease in 
the price, since the decay of the wall was visible only from the outside, and all 
these defects were older than the date of the sale. When this testimony had been 
certified, the seller's agent tried in vain to produce other evidence within the 
deadline of three days. His inability to substantiate the counter-clain was formally 
declared (ta'giz),^^^ and the jurists gave their opinion on how to deal with these 
contradicting testimonies. Ibn 'Attâb held that a judicial ruling (qadà') should be 
'^' See two cases presented to a qadi al-gama'a in my Gerichtspraxis, 235-238. 
^'"~Ahkàm,512i. 
'^ ^ On this, see Ahkàm, 36f. 
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based on the testimony of the witnesses with the most integrity (a'dal), but 
favored an amicable settlement. Basing himself on the Mudawwana, according to 
which evidence of a claimant overruled negative evidence of the defendant, Ibn 
al-Qattan opted for a ruling in favor of the claimant even without further 
evidence. Due to the known integrity of the experts, the house even had to be 
returned to the seller. Of Ibn ' Abd al-Samad's opinion we know that he objected 
to a renewal of the jurisdiction, causing only further difficulties. In considering 
this opinion, Ibn Harîs passed the ruling himself and did not turn the case to the 
qàdi al-gama 'a. His ruling for a return of the house to the seller was implemented 
and Fátima had to pay back the sum she had already received within two months. 
The later claim for accelerated payment was rejected by Ibn 'Attàb on the 
grounds that this was the ruled and registered time limit. ^ "^^  
Cognizant of an assertion reproduced by Ibn Sahl that a mhib aUsûq was not 
allowed to rule on defects in houses and similar problems, unless he was 
particularly authorized to do so (taqdim)}'^^ we may either question the relevance 
of this statement for describing the historical situation in Cordoba or conclude 
that at that time the market inspector was authorized in a general way to decide 
such cases, and in fact did so to a great extent. 
In another case, refunding the price proved to be difficult, because the 
buyer who had to return the money was absent and his own claim against a 
third person, transferred as security to the seller, was not suitable to settle the 
debt immediately. The claimant Maryam returned a house she had bought from 
Khalaf, the saddler {al-Sarmg), for 260 Carmonian gold mitqàl, based on a 
ruling on grave defects. She substantiated her claim for the purchase price of 
260 Carmonian gold mitqàl with a document from Ramadan 458 (August 
1066), which witnesses certified before the market inspector Ibn Harîs. Upon 
leaving town, Khalaf had handed her a document asserting his own claim to 
deferred payment against Ahmad from a similar return of sale over 220 
Carmonian gold mitqàl: «Ahmad and Khalaf had witnesses testify that Khalaf 
had bought from Ahmad a piece of real estate with such-and-such borders for 
a specified price. When various defects became obvious, they were certified in 
court and Ahmad had to return the price and Khalaf the estate. The estate had 
been returned and was taken over by Ahmad, who had instigated Khalaf to 
postpone payment».^^^ 
i74AMâm,574f. 
175 Ahkâm, 7. 
i^^Akâm, 616f. 
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Maryam then went before the market inspector with her claim for payment of 
the credited sum to herself. Summoned in court, Ahmad acknowledged the 
document and his debt. Concerning Khalaf, one or maybe two witnesses ^ •^^  
attested to his residence in the region of Carmona, two others that his 
whereabouts were not known to them. The jurists disputed whether the claimant 
had to certify the document between Ahmad and Khalaf^  ^ ^ and whether the 
testimonies on Khalaf's absence would justify a completion of proceedings 
without his exercising his legal hearings {Vdàr)P^ They agreed, however, that 
the document presented and Ahmad's acknowledgement were not legally 
sufficient for a ruling against the absentee. The claimant had to swear to her 
claim and could then collect the 220 gold mitqal from Ahmad. Without any 
dissent on this point, Ibn 'Attáb held that the defendant's right to a later legal 
hearing had to be fixed (taqayyada) in an addendum to the ruling. ^ ^^  Whatever 
solution the market inspector did favor in the end, an uncomplicated offsetting of 
obligations between those three persons, as those concerned may originally have 
intended, was prevented by the jurists' objections —not to speak of the 
additional costs for longer proceedings. 
With this, we turn from the cases on contractual obligations to disputes over 
various contradictory rights and claims. The first example of this kind was a 
border dispute over a dilapidated building; the case had already gone through 
court proceedings before the qàdi Abü'l-Mutarrif Ibn Siwàr, but was transferred 
to the market inspector, here sahib al-süq Muhammad Ibn Makkï, after the qadi's 
sudden death on 12th Dû'l-Qa'da 464 (July 31, 1072) after having been in office 
only five months.^ ^^ The Muslim Hassan b. 'Abd Allah filed a claim against the 
Jew Isháq for property rights to a building in the Sawáb Mosque Quarter of the 
'^ ^ Differences in manuscripts, compare Ahkàm, 616. 
'^ ^ Ibn al-Qattán held this not to be necessary. Ibn Malik argued that, without certification, 
Khalaf, once returned, could contest the annulment of the sale, and then Ahmad might lose his 
house without having any claim against Maryam. Ibn 'Attab noted that a self-testimony (mashad 
'ala nafsihi) about a debt from an absentee was legally considered to be weak, since the testifier 
might be acquainted with the claimant and acknowledge a higher sum, to the absentee's detriment. 
An acknowledgement in favor of an absentee was binding if the absentee was linked through a 
general mandate partnership to a second person present, as in the case of the silk garment, Ahkàm, 
617f, for the latter, see part I, 77f 
^^ ^ On Ibn al-Qattan's opinion on a testimony of «unknown whereabouts», see below, note 212; 
Ibn Malik voted for a continuation only if his residence was unknown or the road to Carmona 
blocked. Ibn 'Attáb ignored this aspect. Ahkàm, 617f 
^^^ Ahkàm, 617. 
^^ ' On this case, see Ibn Sahl, Wap'iq fi ahkàm qadà' ahí al-dimma fi'l-Andaliis (ed. M. 
Khallàf, Cairo 1980), esp. 60-65, or AMâm, 827-30. 
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old city of Cordoba. In the market inspector's court, Hassan alleged that a small 
house on his estate had fallen to ruin and damaged the separating wall to the 
neighboring real property of the synagogue. When he wanted to rebuild the wall, 
Ishaq, the legal agent of the synagogue foundation, objected and claimed 
property rights to the ruin on behalf of the synagogue. In order to substantiate his 
claim before the market inspector, Hassan presented an istir'a' document from 
Ragab 464/April 1072, whose witnesses attested that the mentioned ruin had 
been certified in the qadi's court to be part of Hassan's piece of real estate. At the 
bottom of the same document, it was attested that the hiyàza, the «on-site 
testimony to borders of a piece of real estate», had been carried out by order of 
the judge.'^^ On the back, it was written that the qadi had heard Ishaq on the 
witnesses of the istir'à' document as well as on those of the estate's borders. 
Ishaq, who had asserted he could refute this testimonial evidence, had been set 
several dates. The qàdi himself ordered that the whole document be certified by 
witnesses (ishàdiihu 'ala nqfsihi bi-dàlika). 
During court proceedings, the market inspector considered the legal claims 
attested to in the document, but could not accept it as evidence, since he had not 
been present at the first proceedings with Ibn Siwár. He obliged the claimant to 
have proceedings and orders of the deceased judge certified in his own court. 
Then Ibn Makkî summoned the defendant to be heard again, but the latter could 
not refute the certification's witnesses. The market inspector had rejected one of 
the two witnesses attesting to the final deadline (talawwum) in the qàdi 
proceedings. This jeopardized legal evidence on this particular point and made 
its repetition necessary. Ishaq was granted a second talawwum, and then the 
judge conferred with the jurists for a ruling. Every legally relevant step of the 
first proceedings had to be certified by two witnesses, whom the new judge had 
to accept. The different steps must have been certified by various witnesses — 
otherwise the rejection of one witness would have required the repetition of other 
parts of the proceedings as well. 
The jurist Ibn Farag opted for a ruling in favor of the claimant because the 
defendant had not been able to defy Hassan's claim within the time limits set. Ibn 
Sahl, on the other hand, held that the document in its present form, which stated 
that «the house mentioned belonged to Hassan's piece of real estate»,^ ^^ did not 
attest to the property rights (milk) of the claimant and was not sufficient for a 
ruling. Other jurisconsults shared his view after some discussion, and the market 
182 w/^ ith Ibn Sahl, Dimma, 62, read «faslu I- 'aqdi bil-hiyàzati bi-amrihi», instead of Ahkàm, 
%2%:faslun in'aqada bil-hiyazatifa-amruhu. 
'^ ^ «Al-baytu l-madküru min huqüqi dàri Hassànin», Ahkàm, 828. 
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inspector called on the claimant to attest to his milk of the house. During a second 
consultation in this case, Ibn Farag insisted on his opinion and Ibn Sahl backed 
his argumentation with references to the Mudawwana of Sahnün, but had no 
copy of his answer when writing down the case nearly 10 years later. We are 
informed neither whether the claimant had presented a second, substantially 
different testimony, as required in the market inspector's first ruling, nor on the 
judge's decision. In any case, this example highlights some difficulties involved 
in confirming private milk in court. ^ "^^  The more pragmatic position of Ibn Farag 
and the qàdi Ibn Siwar was opposed to the very strict one of Ibn Sahl, which set 
high hurdles for such a property dispute. 
Testimony to the borders of real property was the problem in another dispute 
over landed property presented to the market inspector Ibn Hans. Ibn 'Abdüs 
claimed possession of a piece of real estate in Cordoba, which his father had 
endowed along with other property for the benefit of his descendants ( 'aqab), but 
sold during his own lifetime to the Banü Ibn al-Khayta, who were still living 
there. ^ ^^  The endowment deed was legally accepted, based on witness testimony 
that the handwriting was indeed the notary's (sahàda 'ala al-khatt)}^^ As the next 
procedural step, witnesses had to attest to the borders of the endowed real estate 
on-site. Although several people (qawm) attested to the various borders, in 
assessing these testimonies in court, it was found that only one witness had testified 
to all four borders of the premises. As things were, the market inspector refused to 
vahdate the ruling which would have returned the piece of real estate to the 
endowment and finally abandoned the whole case without a decision. Naturally, 
the claimant Ibn 'Abdiis was dissatisfied and later filed a complaint with the sahib 
al-mamlim Ibn Adham. Ibn Adham, in exercising the competences of siyasa 
justice, interdicted any use of the premises by its inhabitants and had the ground 
cleared and sealed off ( 'aqla). The final ruhng, however, is not known to us.^ ^^  Yet 
the first part of this dispute demonstrates quite clearly that the market inspector was 
bound to the rules of the jurists' law in his jurisdiction on real property. 
'^ "^  On the problem of Muslim property rights in al-Andalus going back to the time of the 
conquest, see Chalmeta, P., «Concesiones territoriales en al-Andalus (hasta la llegada de los 
almorávides)», Cuadernos de Historia, 6 (1975), 1-90, esp. 20-26. 
'^ ^ See Ahkàm, 52. The Banû 'Abdüs were a well-known clan in Cordoba. A wazir Abu 'Àmir 
Ahmad b. 'Abdüs was the rival of Ibn Zaydün for Üie Umayyad princess Wallada, who is identified 
by Monès as Abu 'Àmir b. 'Abdüs (died after 472/1079-80), Ibn al-Abbàr, Takmila (Apéndice), no. 
2440; Monès, «Ibn 'Abdüs» in Ef, IH, 681. 
'^ ^ On this specific testimony, compare Ahkàm, 73ff. and Santillana, Istituzioni, 11, 613ff. 
187 Qjj details of this case and a similar one before the same judge Ibn Adham, see my 
Gerichtspraxis, 346-9. 
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In a dispute over an irrigation well and a cistern outside the city walls, various 
testimonies presented in a sequence of claims and counter-claims made a legally 
consistent conclusion very difficult. In the beginning, the claimant Ahmad^^^ 
b. Muhammad b. 'Ataba, son of the tanner, presented to the market inspector, 
here sahib al-ahkàm Ibn Hans, a contract dividing a garden, in which his father 
and the defendant's father had shared irrigation well and cistern equally. This was 
denied by the defendant 'Umar b. Muhammad b. 'Umar, who claimed that both, 
well and cistern, were his property which he used to irrigate his garden. To 
substantiate his claim, Ahmad had the contract of division certified in court and 
the site of well and cistern was attested to in an «on-site testimony» (hiyàza). 
While 'Umar was given several time limits to prove his allegation, Ahmad tried 
to put 'Umar under pressure with the argument that there must be two copies of 
the division contract. He demanded that 'Umar take an oath that he did not have 
a copy of this contract. Ibn 'Attâb held this oath to be necessary, Ibn al-Qattan 
and Ibn Malik were against it, and apparently the oath was not made.^ ^^ 
Three persons had testified to the contract of division and on the piece of real 
estate concerned. Only one of them was finally accepted in court as a witness: 
the defendant proved that another was his personal enemy, which excluded 
testimony according to the jurists' law, and the third one had been generally 
discredited as a witness. 'Umar then in turn presented an istir'à' document to be 
certified in court. Its witnesses attested that both, well and cistern, had belonged 
to his father's property and cultivated land {Vtimàr), and that he had used them 
for irrigation and had paid for repairs on them during the last ten years of his life. 
Ten years earlier, well and cistern had been transferred to his son in the presence 
of the claimant Ahmad, who had then attested to it. According to these 
witnesses' knowledge, nothing had changed until their testimony in the year 
458/1066, when they had heard of Ahmad's claim. Ahmad countered with an 
istir'à' document which attested that well and cistern had been the joint property 
of both fathers, but had not been used during the last fifteen years. In addition, 
Ahmad alleged that he had lent well and cistern to 'Umar without financial be-
nefits. None of these latter /^i/r'â' documents were refuted by the other party, and 
the market inspector consulted the jurists to find a legal solution. Ibn 'Attâb 
and Ibn al-Qattan refused to consider the contract of division, since one witness 
alone did not establish legal evidence. ^ ^^  They held that the document presented 
188 Valiant: Muhammad. 
*^^ On this case, see Ibn Sahl, Ahkâm, 736-741. 
'^ ° In contrast to a principle in Màlikî fiqh, see al-Bàgî, Abü'l-Walíd, al-Muntaqà, 1 vols. (éd. 
Rabat s.d.), V, 195; and Ibn al-'Attár, Kitüb al-wap'îq wa-l-sigillàt (éd. P. Chalmeta and F. 
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by the claimant Ahmad on the non-use of well and cistern during the last 15 years 
was not sufficient, and Ibn al-Qattàn declared its testimony to be void.'^ ^ All 
contracts and testimonies in this case were considered to be insufficient and 
bewildering, and, as a result, inapplicable in favor of any party. Ibn 'Attib 
demanded that both parties should take the oath to their claim: if both swore, 
both would own the well, if one of them refused, the other would get it. Ibn al-
Qattàn, on the other hand, gave more weight to the property rights of 'Umar, 
based on the certification of the latter's and his father's use and repair of the well 
and on Ahmad's assertion that he loaned the well to him. This should result in a 
ruling based on the defendant's oath (al-qada' bi-tark al-amrY^^ unless Ahmad 
could supply witnesses to testify that he had loaned the use to 'Umar. Ibn Sahl 
conceded some useful aspects in Ibn 'Attàb's answer, but considered the latter 
opinion to be clearer. He did not give the decision of the market inspector. 
When seeking legal advice from the jurists, the market inspector was not 
restricted to a world of religious and law-abiding people, but dealt with realities 
of life. In a farmer's claim for joint ownership (sarika) of landed property and 
cattle, the defendant had denied the claim and alleged that the claimant was only 
farming the land without any property rights.^ ^^ Property rights had a decisive 
impact on how revenue was distributed.'^ "^ Without further legal evidence, the 
unnamed sahib al-suq of Cordoba had granted to the defendant the right to swear 
to his counter-claim that the farmer was no partner. After that oath, they set up a 
contract, which ended with the testimony that both sides would refrain from 
future action, claims and oaths for old and new disputes. Later however, the 
original claimant did in fact present witnesses testifiying that the original 
defendant had acknowledged to them several times joint ownership of cow and 
land (baqar wa-zar'). Upon certification of this testimony, the judge (here 
hakam) consulted the jurists. In this matter, disputed among early Màlikï jurists, 
Ibn 'Attâb held that the testimony of witnesses overruled the oath of the 
defendant. The claimant, however, should be obliged to swear that he had not 
Comente, Madrid 1983), esp. 330, Ibn 'Attab declared the rejection of a witness due to personal 
enmity licit also in the case testified to by a witness not a mubarriz, Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 738. 
'^ ^ For details, see Ahkàm, 738-740. 
192 Variation: al-qada' bi-dàlik al-amr, ibid. For the ruling rebus sic stantibus {qadà' tark) 
following the oath of a defendant, Johansen, B., «Le jugement comme preuve. Preuve juridique et 
vérité religieuse dans le Droit Islamique hanéfite», Studia Islámica 72 (1990), 5-17, esp. 8f. 
'^ ^ Ahkàm, 716. On joint ownership in early Màlikï law, see Udovitch, A., Partnership and 
Profit, 21-3. 
'^ "^  In sharecropping, the share was one sixth for the farmer up to one third if he also owned 
the oxen (azwag); compare the legal standard forms for muzàra'a in Ibn al-'Attàr, Watâ'iq, 66-69. 
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known the testimonial evidence in his favor when forcing the oath upon the 
defendant. Then his claim would be recognized, despite the former contract, but 
he should be warned about consequences of a false oath for the next world. ^ ^^  
Admonitions to his partner, who must have taken a false oath in the first place, 
are not transmitted. 
The market inspector's role as judge went beyond the economic sphere and 
touched matters of family relations like maintenance, divorce or inheritance 
disputes. In a dispute between a newly wed bride and her father over the domestic 
utensils and clothing her father had provided for her wedding, the father claimed 
they were a loan, the daughter that they were a gift. 'Abd Allah al-Qabbala sued 
his daughter, whom he had given in marriage to Ahmad, for the return of the 
bridal provisions. Bride and husband refused to comply, and the utensils were 
deposited with some jurists. Ahmad presented an istir'a' document dated 10 
wSafar 458 (January 10, 1066). Its witnesses testified that, 20 days earlier, they 
had heard 'Abd Allah acknowledge that the «clothing» (tiyàb) and domestic 
utensils enumerated in the document were his daughter's belongings. The market 
inspector accepted these witnesses and had their testimony certified on 12 
Safar. »96 
Before a ruling in favor of the bride had been made, however, the merchant 
Khalaf Ibn Fatüh claimed ownership of a carpet and a lamp from the dowry, 
which he allegedly had lent to the father for his daughter's wedding procession. 
Three days after the first testimony in court, several witnesses testified before the 
market inspector that the merchant had offered this carpet for sale in their 
presence without selling it at the end of Dü'l-Qa'da 457. At that time, he had 
owned the carpet, and to the best of their knowledge this had not changed until 
their testimony. On that occasion they also testified that Ibn Fatüh had bought the 
lamp in their presence at the end of Dù'l-Qa'da, but they did not know whether 
he still owned it. One witness testified that Ibn Fatüh had pawned the lamp with 
him and redeemed it before the Feast of Immolation (November 11,1065); he did 
not know whether he still owned it. The market inspector accepted these 
witnesses and had their testimony certified. The merchant's claim thus 
contradicted the father's acknowledgement of his daughter's proprietorship, 
testified to by the first witnesses. When summoned to court a second time, 
the father acknowledged that he had borrowed the carpet and the lamp from the 
'^ ^ Ahkàm, 716f., with only this response. Since the market inspector is not named, the case 
may have occurred before Ibn Sahl's return to Cordoba in the year 456/1064. 
'^ ^ On this case, see Ahkàm, 330-336. 
(c) Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas 
Licencia Creative Commons 
Reconocimiento 4.0 Internacional (CC BY 4.0)
http://al-qantara.revistas.csic.es
316 C. MüLLER AQ. XXI, 2000 
merchant, but said that the remaining utensils (here tiyab) belonged to him. 
Asked about his first acknowledgement in his daughter's favor, he denied the 
soundness of the testimony, but had no legal reasons for a rejection of these 
witnesses. The market inspector then consulted the jurists on several points, 
among them whether the merchant had to take the oath that the lamp and the 
carpet belonged to him.^ '^' 
The daughter's right to the dowry was in jeopardy because her father had 
acknowledged that he did not own lamp and carpet when he had given them to 
her. The jurists agreed on the merchant's ownership of the carpet, but held 
different opinions concerning the lamp.^ ^^ They also agreed that 'Abd Allah's 
first acknowledgement in favor of his daughter, testified to by witnesses, was 
legally valid, whereas his second acknowledgement favoring the merchant did 
not add any evidence. ^ ^^  On the question what to do next with the utensils, they 
differed: according to Ibn 'Attáb, the father had entered liability, dimma, in favor 
of his daughter, which did not give her the right to receive the utensils right away, 
but which was to be transformed into a sale with deferred delivery (salam) 
amounting to the usual father's nuptual gift (naqd) and to an additional sum 
which had to be negotiated with her husband. Then the utensils were to be 
deposited with the father or a third person. Ibn 'Abd al-Samad held that all the 
utensils with a combined value up to that of the father's nuptual gift stayed with 
the daughter, and the rest of it had to be deposited with a third person, but not 
with her father, who had discredited himself. Ibn Malik supported a qadà ' ruling 
against the father based on his acknowledgement in his daughter's favor. 
Possibly this meant that the utensils stayed with her. 
Lamp and carpet, however, were of different legal natures: according to Ibn 
'Attâb, evidence was sufficient to return them to the merchant after he had taken 
the oath that the lamp and the carpet were transferred only to the father and no 
one else. Other jurists believed the oath applied only for the carpet. Ibn Malik, 
who held the carpet to belong to the «clothing» which had to be ruled as 
belonging to the bride, thought that, after the oath, the merchant could only take 
care of the carpet, but not sell it. Without further evidence in favor of 
the merchant, so the opinion of Ibn 'Abd al-Samad, the lamp stayed in the 
i97AM¿m, 330f. 
'^ ^ Only Ibn 'Attáb was in favor of it; Ibn al-Qattàn and Ibn 'Abd al-Samad thought that 
testimony was not sufficient to back ownership, and Ibn Malik even denied his right of possession, 
Ahkàm, 332-5. 
'^ ^ According to Ibn 'Abd al-Samad, the contradicting testimony made the acknowledgement 
meaningless, and Ibn Malik rejected it because, at the beginning, he had claimed these utensils for 
himself, ibid. 
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possession of Fátima as part of her father's dowry. Ibn Malik agreed to such a 
solution, although the lamp neither belonged to the «clothing» acknowledged in 
her favor by her father, nor was there legal testimony about it favoring the 
merchant.^ ^^ Ibn al-Qattan also did not hold that the lamp should be returned to 
the merchant by a ruling. The court secretary Ibn Sahl, who was not a 
jurisconsult in this case, agreed to Ibn 'Attab's opinion and commented in this 
direction. The decision of the market inspector, however, is not known. 
A pregnant woman claimed maintenance from her recently divorced husband. 
He denied paternity, since the waiting period had allegedly already elapsed, and 
refused to pay. Fátima bint al-Zubayr claimed maintenance for the period beginning 
with their divorce by mutual consent (mubàra 'a) and, at the beginning of Ragab 
459 (May l i , 1067), in court two women attested to her pregnancy, with the unborn 
already moving in her belly. The husband, 'Abd al-Rahman b. Muhammad, 
asserted he had acquitted himself from Fátima in a second act of repudiation (talqa) 
on 17th Rabí' 1459/February 5, 1067, a fact corroborated by Fátima. He denied in 
court that she could be pregnant by him, since he had already held himself separate 
from her for seven months before the repudiation. However, he was not sure 
whether she had menstruated since then. His statement was certified. In a second 
bill, written in his hand, he corrected himself and asserted that he repudiated his 
wife when she was menstruating. At that time, he had akeady abstained from 
having sexual intercourse with her to fulfill the waiting period {istibra') and 
continued to do so later on. Witnesses testified in court that they had been married 
for five years and had Hved together under one roof until their divorce. 
Most jurists regarded this refusal of maintenance to be a serious charge of 
adultery which was to be considered a case of hadd punishment. Of all four 
jurisconsults, only Ibn 'Abd al-Samad held that the judge could choose between the 
husband's two assertions, and that in the second case Fátima had no rights against 
her former husband. Two jurists rejected the husband's second assertions: Ibn ' Attáb, 
because it was the result of undue legal instruction (talqm) which did not comply 
with the course of events; and Ibn al-Qattan, since it was written in the husband's 
own hand and not by a third person as witness.^ ^^ Considering the first statement of 
the husband in court, Ibn 'Attáb held this to amount to slander (qadf), the accusation 
of unchastity without testimonial evidence that he could not have been the father of 
the child. In his opinion, the 80-lashes punishment for ^a^could only be prevented 
by the procedure of Wat, in which the husband afíirms under oath that the child bom 
^^ For juridical details, see my Gerichtspraxis, 298, note 247. 
201 Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 436. 
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to her is not his, and she affirms under oath the contrary, both appealing to divine 
punishment if they have lied. Such a couple is then divorced forever.^ ^^  Ibn al-Qattan, 
by contrast, favored the opinion by Malik and his companions that the husband 
could not affirm her unchastity by // 'an, but was to be tried as qâdif and had to 
accept paternity. Ibn 'Attâb differentiated that in this case a husband only had 
to accept paternity after testimonial evidence that he had not denied paternity 
when confronted with her pregnancy for the first time. If he then continued to 
deny paternity, he would be accused of qadf; if she did not succeed in presenting 
witness evidence, she would be subject to the oath of unchastity {IVan). 
According to the fourth jurist, Ibn Malik, the denial of paternity was the most 
complete form of unproven unchastity, no matter what claim for ending the 
waiting period (¿stibrà') accompanied it, and therefore had to be cleared by Wan. 
Unfortunately, we do not know the solution chosen, but cases of li 'an must have 
been very rare in al-Andalus.^ ^^ In such a case, however, the former husband 
would only have to provide maintenance and housing during her pregnancy.^ "^* 
Less dramatic in consequences was the maintenance dispute over Fátima, an 
unmarried older woman, who had lived in the house of her brother 'Abd al-Malik 
after her father's death in the year 447/1055. When 'Abd al-Mahk b. Khayra died 
at the end of Sa'ban 459 (mid-July 1067), his widow and children claimed 
maintenance payments from her second brother 'Abd al-Rahman, who had also 
been guardian of his sister since their father's death 12 years earlier. 'Abd al-
Rahmán lived in the old city in the quarter of the Balansî Mosque in two houses 
which belonged —one partially, the other completely— to his sister Fátima. The 
claimants, represented by the oldest son as legal agent (wakU), claimed that 'Abd 
al-Rahmán should make up for the maintenance payments made by his brother 
to their sister. 'Abd al-Rahmán did not deny that his brother made the payments but 
claimed that they had been done from a sum of 100 gold mitqàl, which once had 
been provided for this purpose by their father Khayra.^ ^^ The jurists agreed that 
'Abd al-Rahman had to pay the usual rent for his sister's houses and that the heirs 
^^ ^ Compare Ahkàm, 435; for Wan also Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Kàfi, 286-291, and Santillana, 
Istituzioni, I, 276-9. 
203 Sources register the U'm by Ibn al-Hindi (d. 399/1008) in the year 388/998 as a special 
event, Ibn Baskuwál, Sila no. 21, Ibn Sa'id, Mugrib, I, 217, no. 147, Qâdî lyâd, Tartîb, Vil, 146f., 
Ibn Farhùn, Dïbàg, I, 172, and Wansansî, Mi'yàr, IV, 76f. with a ruling of li'àn by the sàhib al-surta 
Ibn al-Sarifí in the same year. The unnamed scholar taking the IVàn oath may also have been Ibn al-
Hindî, Ibn Bassàm, Dakhïra, 1,586f. For a different U'm by Ibn Lubàba, see Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 439f. 
2^ Santillana, Istituzioni, 279. 
2°^  On the case see Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 31 Ai. The sum is given with 200 half-gold mitqàl to avoid 
manipulation in the cited document. 
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were to be compensated for the maintenance paid for his sister by the deceased 
also on behalf of his brother. First, however, the heirs had to swear that they had 
not known of Khayra's gift, and that, to the best of their knowledge, Fátima 
did not have any more obligations to the deceased. The underlying principle for 
this choice to have the heirs take the oath rather than the brother was that, in 
Mâlikï law, a positive claim had more weight than a negative denial.^ ^^ The 
market inspector then had a trustworthy person calculate the adequate rent for 
Fatima's houses during the past twelve years. The sum was fixed at 144 1/2 
mitqàl and paid by 'Abd al-Rahman to his brother's heirs. This sum, however, 
was not sufficient to cover the costs of maintenance set by the law for an adult 
woman under guardianship, and her houses were sold to cover maintenance. The 
maintenance claim was not based on the actual costs but on a taxed basket of 
goods she was entitled to in her social position. This amounted to 2 quarters of 
wheat flour, 2 eighths of oil, half a load of firewood of medium size, and 30 
dirham each month, the latter to be reduced to 1 1/2 quarter of wheat flour and 1 
1/2 eighth of oil in the case of rising prices. For clothing, she was entitled to two 
shirts, two pairs of trousers, a pair of shoes, a cotton veil (miqna'), and, for 
winter a lined coat each year and additionally a fur every three years. Every three 
years, she was entitled to a new blanket (milhafa) and, for most of the period 
under consideration, a mumqqa'a, SL cotton cover {kisa' farasiyya) and a woolen 
mattress ifiràs)?^'^ When, in his position as her remaining guardian, 'Abd al-
Rahman tried to force her to live under his roof, she refused, preferring to 
continue living with her other brother's family. The jurists granted her the right 
to choose her domicile. As a result of this case, Fâtima had all her property 
transferred to her relatives she lived with, whereas her living brother got nothing. 
The market inspector dealt with the assertion of contractual rights not only in 
the field of commerce, but also in family law. It was no exception that a woman 
filing for divorce in accordance with her wedding contract brought her claim to 
the market inspector:^ ^^ in the suit of 'Àtika for divorce from her long-absent 
husband, juridical problems arose from differing testimonies about her husband's 
whereabouts as well as from a discrepancy between written testimony and oral 
attestation in court. 'Atika's legal agent presented to the market inspector Ibn 
206 Ahkàm, 375f. 
20^  Ibid., 376. On clothing comp. Arié, R., «Aperçus sur la femme dans l'Espagne 
musulmane», in: Arabes, judías y cristianas: mujeres en la Europa medieval, éd. C. del Moral, 
Granada 1993, 137-160, esp. 151-154. Compare also maintenance requirements for a newborn and 
a six-year-old boy, Ahkàm, 376f. 
2°^  Compare for example the wife of Ibn al-Sarafí, Ahkàm, 732. 
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Harïs an istir ' a' áocumtni testifying to the stipulations of her right of divorce and 
to the long absence of her husband. The witnesses of the document notarized «to 
know the husband Mas'üd b. Ahmad personally and by name and that he had left 
his wife 'Àtika bint 'All one year prior to the date of this document and stayed at 
a place unknown to them. Fifteen years earlier, the husband had called them as 
witnesses of the wedding contract. One of its stipulations was that she was not 
bound to stay his wife if he was absent for more than six consecutive months or 
three yeai's for the pilgrimage, and could then act according to her own will; and 
for this, her assertion would be valid in court (al-qawl qawluha). Once she had 
taken the oath that her husband had left her longer than stipulated, she was free to 
decide on a divorce. She could however grant him a final deadline (talawwum) 
without interrupting the period of his absence required for the divorce».^ ^^ ^ This 
testimony of Ibn al-As'ad and Futays b. Ahmad in an istir'à' document issued in 
Ramadan 457 (August 1065) was supplemented by Abu Muhammad al-Mu'aytî 
and 'Abd Allah b. Muhammad b. 'Abd Allah al-Umawï notarizing that «they 
knew of Mas'üd's absence from his wife, but not whether he had already returned 
to her at the time of their testimony in Sawwal 457 (September 1065)». When the 
witnesses repeated their written testimony orally in court, to make it valid as 
judicial evidence, two witnesses repeated their testimony word for word, and one 
of the witnesses, al-Mu'aytî, added that he knew the husband to be staying in 
Seville. As the next step in court, the wife's will to dissolve the maiTiage was also 
testified before the market inspector, who accepted these witnesses and gave her 
the legal hearings. She did not raise any counter-claim. In the eyes of some jurists, 
the difference between the /^i/r'â' document issued in Ramadan and the additions 
one month later gave rise to the necessity for her to swear that she had not 
renounced divorce, but regarded this as a last deadline for her husband. At this 
stage, the market inspector considered the conditions of the oath fulfilled, and 
allowed her, under some excuse that she could not leave the house, to take the oath 
not in court but at home. She swore that «her husband had not yearned for her 
since his absence, and that her silence within the mentioned period did not mean 
a renunciation of divorce but a deadline to her husband». The wording of this oath 
must have been prescribed by the market inspector, since one of the jurists later 
criticized the second pait as unnecessary, since already granted in the witnesses' 
testimony, and «a judge has to restrict his orders, also for the formula of the oath, 
to the essential, and the market inspector should take care of this in the future».-^^ 
^^^^ On the text of this document, which Ibn Sahl claimed to have transmitted word for word, 
see Ahkàm, 346f. 
^^^ Ahkhm, 349, with some corrections and explanations of Ibn Sahl on this topic, ibid., 349f. 
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If the market inspector had expected the jurists to vote for an instant ruling 
of divorce, he was mistaken. Ibn 'Attàb demanded the legal hearing of the 
husband, whose whereabouts were known through the testimony of al-Mu'aytï; 
this option was rejected by Ibn Malik and Ibn al-Qattan on the grounds that 
testimony of one witness did not constitute legal evidence for a fact to be 
considered at court.^ ^^  Ibn 'Attâb criticized the contradicting parts of the 
testimony of «unknown whereabouts» and the assertion «that he was not on 
pilgrimage», and held that unless this was sorted out, the document had to be 
considered «lacking» (muftaqar), not allowing a judicial ruling (qadà') of 
divorce. Ibn al-Qattan, on the other hand, held that the testimony of «unknown 
whereabouts» should be completed with «being far away» in order to avoid the 
necessity of a legal hearing before a ruling could be passed.^'^ According to this 
jurist, a testimony that the husband «was not on pilgrimage» needed to be 
accompanied by the words «according to the best knowledge [of the witnesses]» 
and could not otherwise be the basis of a ruling. Ibn Malik, however, criticized 
that written testimony and oral attestation in court were not identical. If the 
witnesses were still alive, they should repeat the notarized testimony in court and 
have it certified. This would ensure that any difference between the oral and 
the written form had originated from the notary of the document. He held that the 
judge should combine in suitable formulation the wording of court testimony and 
its understood sense with the intention of the istir'à' document and notarize 
(qayyada) this on the document.^ ^^ Then the judgment could be passed with the 
right of legal hearings to be postponed for the absent husband. Both jurists, Ibn 
Malik and Ibn al-Qattan, criticized that 'Àtika swore at home without any legal 
reason for this.^ '^* If she was one of those women who did not leave the house 
during the day —a sign of high social status— she should swear at court during 
the night. The decision of the market inspector is not known to us, but it seems 
highly improbable that he allowed 'Àtika to be divorced without further legal 
proceedings. 
Another woman sued for divorce on the grounds that her husband had 
remarried his former wife, in which case her own wedding contract stipulated 
instant divorce. Since the husband had married, repudiated and remarried several 
2'» Ahkàm, 349, 352. 
2^ 2 Ahkàm, 348f., criticized by Ibn Sahl as illogical, ibid., 350f. This was a frequent point of 
disagreement between Ibn al-Qattan and Ibn'Attàb. 
^^^ Ahkàm, 351 f. 
2''^  One of the possible reasons was illness. 
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women at the same time, the jurists regarded his case as touching upon matters 
of illicit sexual intercourse {zina). Not much later than May 1066, Mary am bint 
Muhammad b. Asbag asserted before Ibn Maris that her husband 'All b. Tâhir 
had remarried his former wife 'Aziza, and she demanded divorce from him. 
She had married 'All in Safar 457 (January 1065), who had repudiated her with 
one talqa, i.e. revocably, but remarried her at the beginning of Rabí' II 458 
(March 1066). She only consented to this marriage on condition that if 'Alï 
remarried his divorced wife 'Aziza bint Ni'am al-Khalaf, she herself would be 
irrevocably divorced from him. Corroborating her grounds for divorce, she 
presented her wedding contract {kithb al-sadàq) from Safar 457, which also 
notified (qayyada) to the repudiation and to her remarriage thereafter. The 
husband 'All acknowledged the wedding contract and its stipulations, but argued 
that he had not married his former wife 'Aziza bint Ni'am al-Khalaf, but another 
woman from Toledo. Both assertions were notarized on the wedding contract. As 
proof of his assertion, 'All presented two contracts with his present second wife, 
'Aziza bint Asbag b. QulsaP*^ (? Gonzal). In a first contract from 3rd Gumâdâ I 
458 (April 2, 1066), they had dissolved their marriage by agreement 
(mubàra'a),^^^ a fact also attested by two witnesses personally known to the 
market inspector Ibn Han's. One month later, 'All had remarried 'Aziza, and this 
contract of remarriage in Gumâdâ II 458 (May 1066) contained testimony that 
Salwa bint Abfl-Walid had been repudiated irrevocably three times by 'AIL The 
claimant Maryam had already asserted in court that she was also called Salwa 
and her father was called Abü'1-Walíd, and 'All also recognized her as Salwa 
bint Abfl-Walid, but he nevertheless refused to consent to a divorce, on the 
grounds that he had not remarried 'Azïza bint Ni'am al-Khalaf, but 'Aziza bint 
Asbag, which was no reason for a divorce from Maryam. The father of his 
present second wife asserted in court that his daughter was not 'Aziza bint Ni'am 
al-Khalaf. From a legal perspective, Maryam's wedding contract did not require 
a divorce from 'All, but the jurisconsults considered his conduct of marrying, 
repudiating and remarrying several women as making him totally untrustworthy. 
Ibn 'Attâb compared the husband with people avoiding culpability for hadd 
offenses by playing tricks, a conduct rendering his assertions in court 
untrustworthy. The conditions for a divorce from Maryam may have been 
fulfilled, which made any further sexual contact illicit and amount to zina. 
However, since a hadd punishment should only be applied on the basis of facts 
2»5 According to Ahkàm, 421: Ms. Qàf 370 Rabat Awqàf. Q.l.b.y.l., Ms. Qàf 55 Rabat: 
Q.l.y.b.s.l. 
'^^  On mubàra'a s. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford^ 1982, 164. 
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certified as evidence in court, in this case no hadd punishment applied, but the 
contract of remarriage with the Toledo women 'Azîza should be fulfilled and 
Mary am be divorced from 'AIL^ '^^  Eventually coming to the same result, Ibn al-
Qattàn held that after her husband's denial, the burden of proof now lay with the 
claimant Maryam. If she could not present witness evidence, 'All could swear to 
his assertion at the Maqta * al-haqq (literally the «point where the right is cut») 
in the Friday Mosque, that his present wife is not the one mentioned in the 
contract with Maryam. Then his statement would become legally valid, and he 
would not be divorced from Maryam immediately upon his marriage with the 
Toledo 'Azîza, thus not commiting zina. Since 'Alî, however, had sworn to 
his divorce from Maryam when remarrying 'Azîza, he should definitively be 
divorced from her. Ibn Malik considered the husband 'Alî to be a swindler who 
created problems in the religious sphere and who should therefore be lashed. 
Then he should be allowed to swear to his assertion of not having married 'Azîza 
bint Ni'am al-Khalaf, which would have resulted in his divorce from Maryam.^ ^^ 
Whereas Ibn 'Attàb rejected the hadd punishment for reasons of uncertain 
evidence, both other jurisconsults seem to consider 'Alî's oath to be necessary to 
avoid hadd punishment. The jurists agreed that the claimant Maryam had to be 
divorced, but not on the basis of her own wedding contract; rather, the grounds 
were his definite repudiation of her, testified in the wedding contract with the 
Toledan 'Azîza in May 1066. This may have made all the difference for a hadd 
punishment, since the conditions of a divorce were then not fulfilled beginning 
with April 2, 1066, when he had been married to 'Azîza, but only from May on, 
with his remarriage to 'Azîza. But this aspect is not dealt with in the juridical 
responsa. If the claimant Maryam had substantiated that 'Alî had in fact married 
his former wife 'Azîza bint Ni'am al-Khalaf, he most probably would have been 
subject to the hadd punishment of 80 lashes, but in the present situation only Ibn 
Malik voted for physical punishment. 
Quite the opposite of a suit for divorce was the curious case of a man who 
had repudiated his wife three times in the presence of witnesses. But since they 
attested that he had done this not in his right mind, the jurisconsults argued that 
the repudiation was void, since the man had not been conscious of what he was 
doing. Since neither the husband nor the wife was interested in a divorce, the 
claimant must have been some unnamed third person. Ahmad b. 'Ubada asserted 
'^^  Ahkàm, 422f., with Ibn Sahl's commentary ibid., 426f. 
'^^  Ahkàm, 424. Ibn Sahl refrained from commenting on this, since Ibn Malik had argued 
according to his own choice (ikhtiyar) and not followed Màlikï teachings. 
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before Ibn Hans that he was subject to attacks in which he lost his senses and his 
mind and was not able to realize the situation he was in. After some attacks, some 
people present told him that he had repudiated his wife Sita a total of three times. 
He alleged that he did not know of this repudiation and presented a document in 
which witnesses attested that he sometimes lost his mind and that they had heard 
him repudiate his wife three times during one of these attacks. Obviously there 
were no doubts concerning the witnesses, whose testimony was certified at court. 
When the market inspector heard the wife, she confirmed her husband's 
assertions.^ ^^ Some jurists held that in order to prevent a divorce, Ahmad b. 
'Ubáda had to swear that «he had neither known of, nor wished or intended the 
repudiation (talqa), but that he had been informed of it only later». If he also 
swore that his loss of memory was due to an existing illness, he could continue to 
be married to his wife.^ °^ The other opinion rejected the idea of an oath for 
someone who was not conscious at the time of the incident. If he did not know 
anything about it, his people had to decide what to do, but he would not be brought 
to court nor had to swear an oath, as long as the witnesses at least had doubts that 
the accused was master of his mind at the time of the incident.^ ^^ Whatever 
opinion was held by the market inspector, the jurists all agreed that Ibn 'Ubada did 
not have to be divorced by law, because of the specific circumstances of this case. 
As we see from another case, the simple repudiation of a woman was treated much 
less severely than a man who had sworn a false oath, which created such pressure 
that the man left town before the judge enforced the divorce from his wife. 
To conclude this section on divorce, we come to a case only indirectly 
connected to this field of law but highlighting the social situation in Andalusian 
society of that time. Legally speaking, a female slave's claim that she should be 
allowed to be sold to another person touched the property rights of her absent 
proprietor. One slave of Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Sarafi ^^ ^ appeared with the 
market inspector Ibn Hans, here sahib al-ahkàm, and told him that her master had 
been away in the Maghreb for years now and had left her behind without any 
means of living and had not sent her anything so that she was starving. In order to 
2'9AMâm,419f. 
^^ ° Opinion of Ibn 'Attâb and, slightly different, Ibn al-Qattan Ahkàm, 419f. 
221 Ibn Malik, AM¿im, 420. 
222 F rom al-Saraf (Aljarafe), a region wes t of Seville, E. Lévi-Provençal , La Péninsule Ibérique au 
Moyen Age, d'après le 'Kitàb ar-rawdal-mi'tàrfi khabar al-aqñr' d'Ibn 'Abd al-Mun 'im al-Hîmyan, 
Leiden 1938,101 (Arabic)/124 (French), which is to be preferred to «al-Sarqi» in Ahkàm, 611. Known 
scholars of Cordoba are Ibrahim b. Muhammad Ibn al-Sarafí (d. 396/1005-6), Ibn Baskuwal, Sila no. 
194, Qâdî 'lyâd, Tarñb, Vn, 192, and his son 'Abd al-Rahmàn (d. 438/1046-7), Sila no. 705. ' 
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survive, she demanded that the market inspector pass a ruling (nazar) that she 
could be sold to someone else. He ordered her to bring the necessary testimonies 
that she suffered hunger and wanted to be sold to someone who maintained her. 
She then had certified to the judge that her master owned her, that he had departed 
without leaving her anything to provide for herself, that he did not send her 
anything, and that she had no funds of her own nor anyone she could lean on. The 
jurists held that if she certified what she had asserted, the judge should sell her, take 
the selhng price for the absentee and deposit it with him or another trustworthy 
person until he retums.^ ^^ This being done, the divorced wife of Ibn al-Sarafí, 
Fátima, and his legal agent (wakil) disputed over who should receive the selUng 
price. Interestingly enough, none of them had been obliged to provide for the 
starving slave. 
At the time of this second case, the wife Fátima had already been divorced 
as stipulated in her wedding contract because of her husband's prolonged 
absence. After the sale of the slave, Fátima claimed debts against her divorced 
husband, to be repaid from the deposited sum. She alleged before the market 
inspector Ibn Haris that, before he left, she had paid him a hundred mitqal to 
buy her a servant, which in the end he had not done. For a sale with deferred 
delivery (salam) of two mudd of wheat, he should have paid her 18 mitqal but 
did not. Of the two witnesses attesting to the payment of a hundred mitqal, the 
market inspector accepted only one, with the consequence that her claim was 
not fully accepted by the jurists. Then the market inspector summoned the legal 
agent of the absentee, the imàm al-fañda (prayer leader) Muhammad b. Ahmad 
al-Bagám.^ ^"^ His capacity to act as a general mandate agent (wakàla 
mufawwada) was substantiated by an istir'à' document dated from the middle 
of Muharram 459/beginning of December 1066, whose witnesses had attested 
to the kind of agency^^^ and that they had been summoned to attest (ishàd) to 
this mandate by Ibn al-Sarafí and al-Bagání, to the best of their knowledge, 
about one year before the document was drawn up. In his capacity as legal 
agent, al-Bagání acknowledged the absentee's debts to his former wife, a fact 
noted down (taqayyada) at the end of the record of the questioning of the 
defendant (tawqlfip^ The agent, in turn, claimed that the selling price for the 
slave which had been deposited by the market inspector, here hakam, with a 
223ibnSahl,AMflm, 611. 
^^ '^  Better than Ahkàm, 732 «Bàgây». His father may well be the scholar mentioned in Qâdï 
'lyád, Tarñb, VII, 198. 
-"^  On the text, see Ahkàm, 733; compare the standai'd forais in Ibn al-'Attár, Watà'iq, 500. 
22^  Better than Ahkàm, 733, «tawkil», see Ms. Qàf 370 Rabat Awqcif; on tawqlfs&e Santillana, 
Istituziom, II, 585. 
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trustworthy person, should be entrusted to himself, since he was entitled to this 
as the absentee's agent according to this written attestation to his mandate. 
Juridically, two different problems arose: Fitima's claim to have her debt 
repaid and the agent's claim to possession as a trustee. Whereas Ibn al-Qattan 
and Ibn 'Abd al-Samad held that the agent could take possession of the price on 
behalf of his client, Ibn 'Attâb would not accept the existing document, which 
lacked any specified authorization for this.^ ^^ Unless the absentee was very far 
away and attestations in court had been very recent, Ibn Malik did not accept 
testimony to the agency of al-Bagânï in its presented form, but said the case had 
to be resumed before Ibn Hari!s. He reminded the judge that the presented 
document did not contain the summoning for testimony, ishàd, but only the 
witnesses' memory in the form of an istir'à' document. Since the claimant al-
Bagânï alleged that they had written the document from memory, they should 
attest to its content by memory as well. He said that if a judge informs a witness 
of the content of that same witness's written testimony, then the witness could 
not attest «I do testify before you to my [written] testimony».^^^ 
It was disputed whether the debt owed to Fâtima could be settled with the 
selling price of the slave. Ibn 'Attab and Ibn al-Qattan negated this, since her claim 
had been backed by only one witness, and she therefore could not claim property 
{mal) of an absentee. Ibn 'Abd al-Samad held that the 100 mitqal had been a 
deposit in trust (amàna), but not owned by the absentee and therefore should be 
handed to Fâtima. The situation was different with the two mudd of wheat, which 
she could not claim from the absentee since this was «obligation against 
obHgation» (dayn bi-dayn)?^^ With the greatest degree of differentiation, Ibn 
Malik held that, once the agency had been certified, Fâtima should have the right 
to swear to her claim and then receive her money, and that the rest should go to the 
agent as trustee. He argued that testimonial evidence and the acknowledgement of 
the agent supported her claim, which would grant her the right of an oath according 
to the Muwatta' and other texts.^ ^^ We do not know the judge's ruling, but it seems 
very unlikely that the sum remained deposited with the original trustee. 
This was not the only claim presented to the Cordobán market inspector for 
a sum which had been deposited in favor of an absentee. Once a ruling had been 
-^ ^ Ahkam, 733; according to Ibn Sahl, Ibn 'Attab held this view because he did not consider 
al-Bagânî to be a trusted (ma'mün) agent, ibid., 736. 
228AMam,735. 
-^ ^ Ahkàm, 734, this answer was vehemently rejected by Ibn Sahl as ignorant, ibid., 736. 
230AMâm,735. 
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passed to such an effect, the claim for it need not be presented to the same judge 
who had issued the ruling of deposition. At the end of the year 456/1064, 'Abd 
Allah b. Ahmad b. Sa'id claimed before the market inspector, here sahib al-
ahkàm, Ibn Haris a sum deposited for his cousin 'All b. Ahmad b. Sa'îd Ibn al-
Kharraz, which he had inherited from their cousin Muhammad. The former qâdi 
al-gama'a Ibn Sirâg had the death of Muhammad b. 'All b. Sa'id -^^ ' and his legal 
heirs, namely his wife, one sister and his two cousins 'Abd Allah and 'All, 
certified on Monday 18th Dü'l-Qa'da 454 (November 19, 1062). The share of 
'All, who had lived on the East coast of al-Andalus for a long time, was 
deposited with a trustee by orders of the qâdi al-gamà 'a. Shortly after the death 
of the qâdi al-gamà'a Ibn Sirâg in the middle of Sawwal 456 (end of September 
1064) —and this is more than coincidence— 'Abd Allah claimed the share of 
'All, who had died before the cousin he was supposed to inherit from. Since 
sunni Islamic law does not acknowledge the concept that an already deceased 
heir is represented by his descendants,^^^ the claimant would have been entitled 
to this share as the sole cousin of the deceased. To substantiate his claim, he 
presented an istir'à' document from Dü'l-Qa'da 456 (which began on October 
15, 1064), in which witnesses attested, on hearsay from very different sources 
(bi-1-samà ' al-mustafid), that 'All had died three years before that document was 
drawn up.^ -^^  Muhammad b. Yahyâ b. Rifâ', the trustee for the deposited share, 
acknowledged that fact in court and did not pose any legal problems. 
In answering the questions posed by the market inspector Ibn Haris, the 
jurists basically agreed that the death of 'All had to be certified in court and that 
his heirs had the right to be heard in court. This being achieved without further 
problems, the claimant should receive the deposited share from the trustee.^ -^ "^  
This meant, however, that an inmiediate return of the deposit was not possible. 
The claimant 'Abd Allah had two children of his cousin 'All, one absent son and 
a daughter living in Cordoba, certified as his heirs. The absent son obviously was 
not summoned to court, and the daughter did not object against 'Abd Allah 
receiving the deposited share of her father, which he eventually did. Considering 
the fact that the qâdi al-gama'a Ibn Sirâg's ruüng of the case acted as if the 
absent cousin 'All was still alive, although his daughter lived in Cordoba and 
- '^ Possibly the mubarriz witness Muhammad b. 'Alî b. Sa'îd b. Ibrahim from Cordoba (d. 
452/1060), Marràkusï, al Dayl wa-l-takmila, vol. VI (ed. I. 'Abbas, Beirut 1973), no. 1202. 
^^ ^ Schacht, Introduction, 170, Santillana, Istituzioni, II, 514-517. 
~^^ See Ahkàm, 628, for the text of the document; on sama ' mustafid compare Santillana, 
Istituzioni, I, 55. 
^^"^  Ibn 'Attab wanted to postpone 'Alfs right to be heard in court, Ahkmn, 621', other jurists 
did not take up this aspect. 
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witnesses later testified that they had heard of his death, it was probably less a 
matter of knowing when he had died in his domicile on the east coast of al-
Andalus, but rather a matter of accepting this information and those persons 
bearing it as witnesses. The claimant must have waited until the death of the 
qadi, who had denied him the share, and then collected witness testimony for his 
claim before the market inspector. 
Whereas in the former case the presiding qâdi of the first proceedings had 
already died during the second proceedings under Ibn Harïs, another inheritance 
dispute was brought to the market inspector although the qàdi originally dealing 
with it was still in office. The agent of the widow of 'Abd Allah Ibn AM Zayd 
complained before the market inspector Ibn Harïs that the amicable setdement 
concerning her husband's inheritance, which had been ratified by the qâdi al-
gamà'a Ibn Baqi (456/1064-461/1069), had been broken by her brother-in-law 
and his mother. The latter party held that the settlement contradicted the law and 
therefore was void. After the death of 'Abd Allah Ibn Abî Zayd, his widow 
'À'isa, his mother Safiyya and his brother Ahmad were certified as legal heirs. 
For the division of property, the widow made Muhammad al-Qurasî her legal 
agent, and the mother delegated this task to her son Ahmad. Furniture and 
clothing of the deceased were sold for silver coins to the value of 300 gold dinar 
and two vineyards yielded 110 gold dinar, which Ahmad also gave to his mother 
Safiyya. The widow's agent agreed to this sale with his signature, but claimed 50 
mitqal as a debt to his client, which the deceased still owed to his wife as part of 
her kali, the deferred dower.^ ^^ Ahmad then demanded that the widow take the 
oath that she had neither received this sum nor given it as a present to her 
husband. At this point, events in court must have escalated, since both parties 
accused the other of withholding property from the inheritance: the widow's 
agent denied she had withheld 50 mitqal from the sale of Malagan yam and in 
turn claimed that the horse was part of the inheritance and the black slave 
belonged to the widow. Ahmad alleged that the horse was his and the slave had 
been bought by the deceased, which made him part of the inheritance. The qadi 
al-gamci 'a had all the property of the widow certified, and both parties came to 
the following amicable agreement: Ahmad was to pay 70 mitqal to the agent of 
the widow, was to receive the slave and all allegations against both sides were to 
be dropped. The remaining dower should be paid with the silver coins from the 
sale of the inheritance, but only after real estate {asl) and movable property {mal) 
--'^ On kali, compare Santillana, Istituzioni, I, 220. 
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of the deceased had been certified. Before that, however, the widow was to take 
the oath that her deceased husband still owed her the deferred dower. 
Both agents agreed to this settlement in a binding manner, and the agent of 
the widow received 39 mitqàl hàkimï, the currency once stipulated in the 
wedding contract, and the slave in turn now belonged to mother and son.^ ^^  Both 
agents ruled out further claims and court proceedings except the widow's oath 
and the certification of the inheritance. The qâdi al-gamà'a Ibn Baqî had all steps 
of the proceedings certified in court and notarized in a document of agreement 
from Safar 457 (January 1065). Before the widow had sworn to her claim, 
however, the other side broke the agreement and she filed a claim for the 
withheld items and fulfillment of the agreement. Summoned before the market 
inspector, Ahmad argued that the stipulations of the agreement were irregular 
(fàsid), which the widow could only counter with the argument that all 
agreements were valid according to prevailing practice (sunna). 
Most jurisconsults indeed held the settlement signed by the qâdï to be 
irregular (fisid) and that it had to be annulled (nasakha): for Ibn al-Qattan, even 
the sale of the vineyard and its offsetting (sarf) the dower was irregular, since 
Malik had forbidden the selling of inheritance before all debts had been 
assessed.^ -^ ^ Contradicting him on this point, Ibn ' Abd al-Samad held that the sale 
of the inheritance was licit, since it was not distributed among the heirs but 
served to liquidate (igtimà \ literally «collecting») the inheritance and to efface 
the debt of the dower. All other actions and provisions, however, he considered 
void, since the widow had not yet sworn to her claim for the dower, which 
resulted in an —illicit— «postponed change of obligations» {sarf muta 'akhkhar: 
dayn bi-dayn). The widow had to return the money from the sale and the whole 
case should be reconsidered.^^^ Ibn Malik approved of this latter opinion that the 
contract was void, but conceded to the judge the right to sanction the settlement 
according to his own discretion (al-igtihàd ba'd al-istikhàra). In order to avoid 
its annullment, one could, on the basis of the Koran, apply the concept of salaf, 
a sale with deferred delivery.^ ^^ Only the prestigious jurist Ibn 'Attàb held the 
settlement between widow and other heirs to be valid, since only God could 
invalidate any legally binding agreement.^ "^ ^ Unfortunately, we do not know 
whether the market inspector had jurisdiction over the contractual agreement 
sanctioned by a qadi, we also cannot say whether he in fact did invalidate it; Ibn 
^^ ^ Ahkàm, 843f., what happened to the 70 mitqàl is not known. 
237 Ahkàm, 846. 
238AMàm, 847. 
239 Ahkàm, 847, according to Ibn Sahl, ibid., 850, this was Koran 4,128 and 4,114. 
240 Akflm, 845. 
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Sahl did not consider this point to be important for the juridical discussion of the 
case. Similar settlements between heirs seem to have occurred quite frequently.^ '*' 
Another inheritance dispute concerned a small house still inliabited by some 
heirs, which others sued to have vacated in order to reach a better price for it. The 
unnamed market inspector (sahib al-ahkàm) consulted the jurists on such a case, 
in which some heirs of Khalaf b. Sa'ïd had demanded an assessment of the house 
for sale and claimed that this should be done in an uninhabited state. The other 
group had consented to the assessment, but insisted on hving in the house for 
rent.-"^ ^ Ibn 'Attâb held with his teachers that a house too small for partition should 
be vacated by its inhabitants and sold in such a state, unless strangers agreed to rent 
the house on short notice under the condition that it may be sold.-"^ ^ Ibn al-Qattan, 
on the other hand, considered the high damage caused by the loss of rent and 
suggested an agreement between the heirs on a sum of rent. Should this fail, the 
house had to be vacated and offered publicly for rent under the reservation of a 
later sale. The highest bidder could live in the house and had to pay the heirs in 
proportion to their shai'es. The heirs, however, had the right to overbid this rent and 
live in the house.^ "^ Such constellations must have been quite frequent in a society 
in which the law of inheritance confronted the widow living in her husband's 
house with his other agnatic heirs, who did not belong to the same household but 
could demand a partition of the inheritance. The role of the market inspector in 
these cases was not to determine the inheritance and its partition as such, but he 
was consulted in aspects connected to the selling of the inherited property. 
Disputes between neighbors were also brought before the market inspector. 
There, legal solution was not based on contractual law, but considered on the 
basis of the principle «to prevent detriment without causing undue disadvantage» 
{là darara wa-B diràra)?^^ In the first case of this kind, Yahyà b. Ga'far b. 
'^*' Compare standard forms in Ibn al-'Attar, Waki'iq, 428 if., on the settlement between widow 
and other heirs; see also Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Kafi, 45If. A case of refused settlement in Ahkàm, 210-
222, slightly abbreviated in Wansarïsî, IX, 400-404. 
-"^^ Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 730-732. This case may well have happened before Ibn Sahl's 
employment as a scribe under Ibn Maris in 456/1064, since he cites the case from a copy of Ibn 
Malik and did not name the judge. 
243AMâm, 731. 
^'^ Ahkàm, 73If. Ibn Malik agreed with this response, which he claimed to be the opinion of 
the Mâlikî school. 
"^^^ On this tradition from the Prophet, compare Malik's Miiwatta ' in the recension of Yahyà b. 
Yahyà al-Laytî (éd. S. al-Lahhàm, Casablanca 1989), nos. 1461, 1540; on the legal concept i.e. «to 
prevent detriment caused by intruding upon other's rights, but not for excessive disadvantage to the 
other side», see Santillana, Istituzioni, I, 380f. 
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Mudimm and his wife Hind alleged that their neighbor Israq, a client (mawlû) 
of Muhammad b. Hubba,^ "^ ^ had recently attached some stairs to the northern wall 
of their estate, situated in the Abu Riyáh Mosque Quarter in the old city of 
Cordoba. They claimed that these stairs leading to one of their neighbor's rooms 
damaged their wall. In addition, the edges of two thresholds and the beams of a 
room had been inserted into the ceiling of their reception hall; and the smoke 
caused by the recently established oven in that room also damaged them. Israq 
acknowledged her neighbors' right to an intact wall, but claimed that stairs and 
oven had been long established. Aside from this acknowledgement, it was 
certified in court that the ceiling belonged to the claimant's real property and, to 
the knowledge of these witnesses, had not been sold. Two witnesses testified in 
favor of the claimants that neither thresholds nor beams had been attached to the 
wall, and one of them added that he knew the wall in that condition twenty years 
ago. The defendant in turn presented an istir'à' document whose witnesses 
attested to knowing that the present situation, with the stairs and beams and 
thresholds inserted into the ceiling, had existed for more or less 30 years. Only 
one of these latter witnesses, however, was accepted by Ibn Harîs.-'^ '^  Ibn 'Attâb 
and Ibn al-Qattan held that the defendant had not succeeded in establishing her 
claim and that a qadà' ruling should be made to dismantle these new 
constructions and to restore the earlier situation. Ibn al-Qattan argued that the 
claimants had to take the oath because of the legal doubt (subha) caused by the 
one witness in favor of the defendant, but Ibn 'Attâb did not hold an oath to be 
necessary. Ibn Malik held the testimony in favor of the claimants to be without 
legal consequences, since it attested to a very old situation. If constructions 
actually were from that period, they would be sanctioned by their age {istahaqqa 
bil-qidm). Since however the defendant had not established in court that the 
constructions were old, the preponderance of legal evidence returned to the 
claimants, who could take the oath that the constructions had been recent. This 
would result in their dismantling. But they could also refuse to swear, which 
—unspokenly— would result in preserving the status quo. In the end, Ibn al-
Qattan and Ibn Malik came to the conclusion that the claimants could only have 
the constructions removed if they took the oath that they were recent ones. Ibn 
'Attâb opted against the oath,^ "^ ^ and we are not informed about the judge's 
~^^ Variation «Hayyi», both not found in biographical dictionaries. 
-"^^ On this case, see Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 1071-3, NawàziL 53f., Watâ'iqfi su'ün al-'umràn (éd. 
M. Khallàf, Cairo 1983), 82-86. 
"^^^ This is totally ignored by Khallâf in Ibn Sahl, 'Umrcin, 24. The jurisconsults did not deal 
with the possibilities Khallâf presents. A continuation of the proceedings with new evidence cannot 
be ruled out, of course, but this must remain speculation. 
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decision. It is important to say that testimonial evidence in this case was not 
rejected because it was contradictory, but for legal reasons in each individual 
testimony.-"^ ^ 
Another case before the unnamed sahib al-ahkam shortly after 462/1070^^^ 
dealt with the damage caused by people looking into their neighbors' premises 
in the densely populated old quarters of the city. Two sons of Ibn al-Mírání^ -^ ^ 
sued their neighbor Fátima because people could reach a forward extended roof 
of her house by a door, sit there and look from that into their own premises. The 
sill, raff,^^^ of this roof terrace was so near to their own roof that one could even 
climb over and look into their courtyard. Witnesses certified in court that this was 
a substantial detriment to the claimants. The husband of the defendant, Abu 
l-Qasim al-'Umarî, who was her legal agent in this case, had his own witnesses 
certify, on the other hand, that this door was not causing detriment to the 
neighbors: this roof faced a different direction and one could not see anything of 
the neighboring piece of real estate. The claimants could not, for any reason, 
reject these witnesses, and referred to what habitual practice (sunna) had made 
obligatory. The defendant also stated in court that no one ever went on this roof, 
but the claimants asserted that they had seen persons there who behaved in a 
disgraceful manner.^ ^^ 
Considering these contradictory testimonies, both jurisconsults, Ibn Sahl and 
Ibn Farag, held that the testimony of detriment took precedence over its denial,^ "^^  
and that the detriment must be ended. But under the principle of là darara wa-là 
diràra, the detriment in this case was not so substantial that the door had to be 
removed. The judge decided to have a big balustrade (sargab) installed in front 
of the door to prevent access to the roof. In this, he followed the opinion of the 
jurisconsult Ibn Farag, who referred to a similar decision of the qadi al-gamà 'a 
Ibn Zarb (d. 391/1001).^ ^^ Ibn Sahl, who in his own fatwà had suggested 
249 But, see KhaUàf in Ibn Sahl, 'Umràn, 24. 
2^ ^ Both jurists in this case, Ibn Farag and Ibn Sahl, had become members of the sura after the 
deaths of Ibn 'Attàb (462/1069), Ibn al-Qattàn (460/1068) and Ibn Malik (460/1068). 
--'*' A certain Ibn al-Mîratï al-Balawï (d. 428/1036-7) is mentioned by Ibn Baskuwàl, Sila 
no. 89. 
2-^ " Not «rabb», as in Ibn Sahl, 'Umràn, 111. 
2^ ^ Ibn Farag refers to this in his fatwa. 
2^"* If, however, the witnesses of a denial had a higher integrity, so Ibn Farag in his response, 
court witnesses and experts had to go to the site and see whether one could look into the neighbors' 
buildings. 
^^^ Ibn Sahl, 'Umràn, 112f. This decision was made according to discretionary opinion 
{istihsan) and not authoritive rulings; Ibn Zarb to the qadi Ibn al-Saffar (d. 429/1037-8), cited by 
IbnSahl, z77/¿/., 115. 
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blocking the door with a barrier, consented to the solution finally taken.-^^ This 
case is a good example of what was socially acceptable in Cordobán society. 257 
In none of these disputes between neighbors was the claim of detriment 
challenged at the level of religious considerations, as happened in the following 
case: someone complained to the market inspector Abu 'All Ibn Dakwan^^^ about 
Sulayman al-Saqqaq who ascended to the roof of a mosque near his home in the 
middle of the night, called for prayer and prayed aloud until dawn. The claimant 
asserted that this conduct was a detriment to the neighbors (darar 'ala al-gimn). 
Sulaymán, when asked by the judge, acknowledged his behaviour, but alleged 
that he did this only for one hour. Sulaymán was a follower of AbüT-'Abbas 
Ahmad b. Abfl-Rabi' al-Ilbïrï, a successful preacher (wà'iz) in the Great 
Mosque of Cordoba, who died there in 432/1040.^ *^^  When Ibn Dakwàn 
consulted the jurists, two of them, Ibn Gurg and Ibn Dahhün, were favorable to 
the complaint, both on the grounds that Sulayman's conduct deviated from that 
of his devout predecessors. But two other jurists, al-Masîlï and Ibn 'Attàb, 
supported the defendant's behaviour as pious conduct.^ ^^ The striking fact that 
this complaint was treated as a question of religion can be seen in its relation to 
the preacher Ibn Abfl-Rabi', whose sudden death during one of his sessions in 
the Great Mosque only a few years later —the claim against Sulaymán was 
before the death of Ibn Dahhün and al-Masïlï in 431/1039— had caused turmoil 
among the common people.^^' Contrary to Marin's interpretation, al-Masîlfs 
objection, that a case like this should not be presented to the wordly power 
(sultan), was not directed against the qadi jurisdiction^^^ but against the market 
inspector Ibn Dakwan in his capacity as agent of the political power. For all 
practical aspects of jurisdiction, we should not forget that the case was filed as a 
256 For this case, see Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 1089-1091, 'Umràn, 111-115, Nawàzil, 61f. 
25^  For a discussion on neighbors' rights, see the juridical opinions given to a case before al-
Hasan Ibn Dakwan during his term as qàdi after 435/1043, Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 1080-89, 'Umràn, 98-
111, A^ awâz~z7, 56-60. 
25^  The text refers to al-wazir al-qàdi during his time in the khuttat ahkàm al-sïiq, 'Umràn, 53. 
This explains why he is called qàdi in the source. He became qadi in 435/1043 after the death of 
most of the jurisconsults in this case, Ibn Baskuwàl, Sila, no. 312, Ibn Sa'ïd, Mugrib, I, 160f. (no. 
103), and Ahkàm, 7. 
25^  Ibn Baskuwàl, Sila, no. 100, Qàdï 'lyâd, Tartïb, VHI, 39, but not al-muqri' Abu 'Umar 
Ahmad b. Abfl-Rabî' from Baeza, who died in 446/1054 in Almeria, Ibn Baskuwàl, Sila, no. 112. 
260 Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 1032-35, Nawàzil, 34-36, 'Umràn, 53-63; the doctrinal considerations of 
this case are well explained by Marin, «Law and Piety: a Cordovan Fatwà», in British Society for 
Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin, 17 (1990), 129-136. 
261 Qàdï 'lyàd, Tartïb, VIH, 39, and Ibn Baskuwàl, Sila, no. 100. 
262 Marín, Piety, 136, for al-Masîlî's argument, see 'Umràn, 59. 
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complaint about public behaviour to one's neighbors' detriment, and that 
al-Masîlï developed his argument in the juridical religious discourse. 
If the former case was a matter of moral conduct (hisba) and its enforcement 
(ihtisàb),^^^ the power of this concept for judicial practice can best be seen in the 
following case: a muhtasib complained against Ahmad b. 'All b. Dalhat, who had 
acknowledged his vow that the brother of his wife would never enter his house 
again. He alleged that the brother-in-law had later entered the house, and that Ibn 
Dalhat had broken his vow.^ "^^  In order to substantiate his claim, the muhtasib 
presented to the market inspector Ibn Haris an istir'ci ' document which was dated 
1st Dû'l-Higga 457 (November 3, 1065). Its witnesses attested that they heard 
Ibn Dalhat acknowledge this vow and that they saw the brother-in-law later enter 
his house. When some witnesses repeated their accusations personally in court, 
the market inspector ordered that the istir'à' document be certified and its 
witnesses checked for their integrity in the tazkiya procedure. Ibn Dalhat was 
heard in court and given several periods for his defence, but all we know is his 
assertion that «the witnesses knew of his living with his wife after the oath until 
the beginning of Safar 458 (beginning of January 1066)», which was not a 
counter-claim.^ ^^ Some jurisconsults had demanded a 15-day limit by which time 
certification of the claim was to be accepted by the court. Ibn Dalhat must have 
seen his chance to escape a sentence by leaving the city for Baeza (Bayyàsa), a 
town east of Cordoba. 
All jurists who were consulted by Ibn Hans held that Ibn Dalhat «broke his 
vow» (hanat), and that this had to be effaced by expiation {kajfàrà)?^^ Ibn 'Attâb 
offered two possibilities to the fugitive: First, he could return to the market 
inspector before a qadà' ruling was passed. The market inspector should then 
rule that he give a third of his property to the poor and go on pilgrimage to 
Mecca. As expiation, he could choose between liberating his slaves or feeding 
and clothing 15 poor people, otherwise he should fast three days without 
intermption.^^^ This ruling was only possible after the wife had been heard at 
2^ ^ See Ibn 'Attâb in 'Umràn, 60f. 
^^ On this case, see Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 441-445; Wansansï, Mi'yàr, IV, 80-82, without any 
names or date. 
^^ ^ Ibn Sahl referred to it in his commentary on when the waiting period of the divorced wife 
should begin. Ahkàm, 443f. 
^^ ^ On Mâlikï rules about violations of an oath that needed expiation, see e.g. Ibn ' Abd al-Barr, 
Kàfi, 193; on oaths generally, see Schacht, Introduction, 159. For a case before the qàdi on whether 
a man had commited hanat, see Ibn Sahl, Ahkmn, 459f., or Wansaiisî, Mi'yàr, IV, 84f. 
^^ ^ These possibilities are identical to those enumerated by Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, Kàfi, 198, with 
the exception that the latter stipulated the feeding of 10 poor people. 
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court as well. Secondly, the qàdi's ruling, on the other hand, was that he should 
divorce his wife definitively and liberate all his slaves. The judge could postpone 
legal hearings for the defendant, but did not have to do so; whatever decision was 
made had to be noted in an appendix to the ruling. 
Ibn al-Qattan voted that the market inspector should rule to divorce the 
couple and liberate the man's slaves. If the clearance (tazkiya) of witnesses had 
been done through persons other than usual, a point not specified in the market 
inspector's report, Ibn Dalhat and his wife had to be heard before 
the final ruling.^ ^^ This precaution may indicate that the witnesses of the tazkiya 
in fact had differed in this case. Legally speaking, the opinions of Ibn 'Attáb 
and Ibn al-Qattan did not contradict each other in the eyes of their contemporary 
Ibn Malik. Since Ibn 'Attâb mentions a possibility of circumventing divorce, 
we may conclude that Ibn Dalhat had not vowed to separate from his wife,^ ^^ but 
that this was a penalty inflicted upon him for his breach of vow. We are 
unfortunately not informed about the outcome of this case. Assessing the 
possibilities given to the defendant, he might either return to Cordoba to await 
the ruling by the market inspector, or stay where he was and hope to escape 
penalty. But then a qadà' ruling could be inflicted in a different city as well.^ ^^ 
Considering these cases before the Cordobán market inspector, we see his 
efforts to comply with the rules of evidence established by Mâlikï//^/z. In this 
respect, we cannot clearly distinguish between claims in contractual law and 
other disputes, even if, in matters of dispute, testimonial evidence was more 
often subject to doubt or suspicion. To a certain degree, the jurisdiction of the 
market inspector seems to have overlapped with that of the qàdi al-gamà 'a. 
However, indications that the market inspector was subordinated to the qàdi in 
a hierarchical sense cannot be found in the sources for the period studied here. 
Or how would one explain, for example, that the claim for breach of an 
agreement, which was sanctioned by the qàdi, was dealt with by a 
—subordinate— market inspector? And why, in such a case, did the market 
inspector certify to all procedural steps in a case he took over from the 
deceased qàdi and even reject one of the witnesses formerly accepted by 
~^^ Ahkàm, 443. Ibn 'Abd al-Samad had voted similarly, according to Ibn Sahl. 
^^ ^ The Màlikî penalty for this, 15 lashes, was not mentioned in any of the answers. 
^'^^ Compare the case of Ibn Hàtim, Ahkàm, 1150-7, on this case, see also Fierro, M. «El 
proceso contra Ibn Hàtim al-Tulaytulï (años 457/1064-464/1072)», in Estudios Onomástico-
Biográficos de al-Andalus, 6 (1994), 187-215, esp. 191 and 197. The market inspector did not have 
the legal power to write authoritatively to judges in other cities, Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 1. This may have 
meant that his rulings were not to be imposed outside the area of his purview. 
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the qadil Yanagihashi's thesis of a «hierarchy of judgments»-'^ ^ is based on a 
wrong understanding of an assertion Ibn 'Attab made when asked by Ibn Sahl 
whether a hakim had to reexamine the facts of a case upon assuming the office 
of qadi. After answering «no», Ibn 'Attab informs Ibn Sahl that this was how 
he had responded to Abu 'All Ibn Dakwan when the latter was promoted from 
the surta wa-süq jurisdiction to become qadi?^^ This event took place in 
435/1043,^ '^ ^ and it is clear from the context that the judge Ibn Dakwan 
consulted the jurist Ibn ' Attâb. The excerpt does not refer to «judgments of the 
police or the market inspector which subsequently were raised to the status of 
judicial decisions in a qàdi court».^ "^^  But, if we rule out a hierarchical structure 
of offices, this does not mean that the qàdi could not annul a binding ruling of 
the market inspector if it contradicted the law. On the contrary,-^^ but such an 
annulment was based on legal considerations by the jurists, and not on a 
hierarchy of orders. 
One way to understand the various judicial competences is to compare the 
legal quality of rulings. Unfortunately, hardly any rulings are mentioned, 
neither for cases before the qàdi nor before the market inspector. We may 
learn from juridical sources that the revision of a ruling would be legally 
possible, if the judge was generally not considered «just», or if evidence 
leading to the ruling proved to be false.^ ^^ If we consider the diligence with 
which the market inspector had various elements necessary for a legal title 
substantiated according to Mâlikï law, e.g. circumstances of inheritance, 
borders of a piece of real estate, etc., we must assume that rulings passed by 
the market inspector on these grounds and in accordance with the jurists' 
views were not easily revised by other judges, not even by the qadi 
al-gamà'a. We do not really know whether the market inspector had 
the capacity to pass a qadà ' ruling}^^ There are indeed cases in which the 
^^ ' Yanagihashi, H., «The Judicial Functions of the Sultan in Civil cases according to the 
Màlikïs up to the Sixtli/Twelfth Century», Islamic Law and Society, 3 (1996), 41-74, esp. 71. 
^^ ^ Wa-bidàlika aftaytu Abà 'Alïyi bna Dakwmin hlna rtafa 'a min ahkmni s-surtati wa-s-süqi 
ilà ahkümi l-qadàH, cf. Ibn Sahl, Ahkàm, 1. 
273 Ibn Baskuwàl, Sila, no. 312. 
-'^^ Yanagihashi, Judicial Functions, 11. 
27^  For one example, see Khusanî, Qudàh, 111. 
'^'^^ On Judicial review in general, see Powers, D., «On Judicial Review in Islamic Law», Law 
& Society Review, 26 (1992), 315-341; esp. for Mâlikï/z^/z in the Cordobán context, see my 
Gerichtspraxis, 144-6, 156f.; compare also the case of the farmer who claimed for joint ownership 
after a first ruling had been passed, cited above. 
277 On qadà\ see Johansen, B., «Wahrheit und Geltungsanspruch: Zur Begründung und 
Begrenzung der Autoritat des ^Âçi-Urteils im islamischen Recht», in: La giustizia nelValto 
medioevo II (secoli ix-xi). Quarantoquattresima Settimana di studio: Spoleto 11-17 aprile 1996, 
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jurisconsults demand such a decision. But this may only indicate that all 
conditions for a qadà' are given in these specific cases, which need to be 
transferred to the qudi al-gamñ'a for such a ruling. When the market 
inspector in fact did pass a ruling in these cases, it was not explicitly called 
qadà'}^^ And in the case of the fugitive Ibn Dalhat, an explicit difference 
between the ruling of the market inspector and a qàdi ruling was made.^ ^^ In 
principle, a sahib al-süq, appointed by the same ruler who appointed the 
qadi, could pass a valid qadà' on property and land {amwal wa-ard) if 
authorized to do so, no matter whether there was a qadi or if he had died.^^° 
This, however, was subject to a political decision, and not part of the inherent 
authority of a sahib al-suq?^^ It may be significant for the strong position of 
the market inspector in the field of civil jurisdiction in the Cordobán context 
that, in the period of the early cases, no qàdi was appointed to the city between 
Sa'ban 430 and Muharram 432 (end of April 1039 until September lOAO)}^^ 
Half a generation later, the Gahwarid ruler Abu al-Walîd Muhammad had his 
wazir Ibn al-Saqqa' administer the qadi's jurisdiction for 6 months beginning 
with the death of the qadi Ibn Zarb on Friday 25th Ragab 441?^^ Both events 
indicate the ruler's desire to prevent a strong qàdi who might become a rival for 
power within the city. 
Finally, we must distinguish between the market inspector's capacity as a 
judge in civil matters concerning contracts or disputes and his function of 
supervising the markets and preventing fraud and false measures. In this latter 
function, he had to act preventively and could start an inquiry without any 
person having presented a claim before him.^ "^^  When he acted «to promote 
the good and forbid the evil», the market inspector was not bound to the 
procedural law of Malikî//^/î, which, on the other hand, he complied with as a 
judge in civil cases. Yet many regulations of market supervision in some of the 
so-called hisba manuals are based on the legal teachings of Malik or later 
Spoleto 1997, 975-1065, esp. 1015-22, who asserts a lack of discussion in the early Màliki school, 
ibid. 1022. 
^'^^ The market inspector did not transfer the case of contradicting testimony on the defects of 
a house to the qàdi, but decided it on his own, see above, 309. 
279 See above, 334. 
2^ ° Bàgï, Muntaqà, V, 226, in reference to Sahnün. 
2^ ^ To demonstrate the fluidity of authority ascribed to these offices, one may refer to the much 
later al-Qaráfí, who rejected the idea that the sahib al-hisba should rule on weddings and human 
transactions (mu'àmalât), Tamylz, 168. 
282 Qâdî 'lyâd, Tartïb, YLU, 87, and Ibn Sa'id, Mugrib, 70 (no. 14) and 160 (no. 102). 
283 Ibn Sa'id, Mugrib, I, 161, no. 104. 
2^"^  Compare references in Part I, notes 135 and 146, as well as Johansen, Vérité, 129-32. 
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Màlikî jurists,-^^ and thus reflect a strong orientation towards the fiqh. The 
Cordobán market inspector of the 5th/llth century is an example of how 
the legal norms elaborated by the jurists influenced spheres of jurisdiction which 
strictly speaking, did not belong to the «rehgious» qàdi justice. The scope 
of the jurists' law was in practice not restricted to the qàdi. The application of the 
fiqh by the market inspector may be seen as a link between an uncompromising 
fiqh jurisdiction and that of a mere utilitarian one. In effect, the market inspector 
was an officer who exercised what later jurists called siyasa sar'iyya, the 
administrative justice oriented towards and inspired by the sacred law.^ ^^ 
ABSTRACT 
Using court cases from Ibn Sahl's judicial decisions collection al-Ahkàm al-Kubrci as 
well as data from biographical and historical sources, the present article examines both 
history and jurisdiction of the «police and market inspector» {sahib al-surta wa-l~süq) in 
Cordoba. 
During the taifa period, this Umayyad expression gave way to the «inspector of 
judgements» {sahib al-ahkam). Through a wide range of more than twenty cases between 
the years 456/1064 and 464/1072, it is demonstrated how this non-^âdï judge adhered to 
procedural and substantive law as interpreted by Màlikî fiqh. 
RESUMEN 
Este artículo examina el desarrollo histórico y la jurisdicción del «inspector de la poli-
cía y del mercado» {sàhib al-surta wa-l-süq) en Córdoba a través de los casos judiciales 
tomados de la colección de dictámenes jurídicos de Ibn Sahl al-Ahkàm al-Kubrà y de 
fuentes biográficas e históricas. 
Durante el período de Taifas, esta expresión omeya dio paso al «inspector de senten-
cias jurídicas» {sàhib al-ahkàm). A través de más de veinte casos, datables entre los años 
456/1064 y 464/1072, se demuestra cómo este juez, que no era qàdi, seguía en sus sen-
tencias el fiqh málikí, tanto en las leyes procesales como en la ley sustantiva. 
~^^ See the «Kitàb Abkàm al-sïiq» by Yahyá b. 'Umar (d. 289/901), éd. M. Makkî in Revista 
del Instituto Egipcio de Estudios Islámicos, 4 (1956), 59-151, and the «Risàlafi âdàb al-hisba wa-
l-muhtasib» by A. b. 'Abd al-Ra'üf, ed. E Lévi-Provençal, Trois traités hispaniques, Cairo 1955, 
67-116. Compare Chalmeta, Señor, Til, and 384; generally on hisba manuals in al-Andalus, idem, 
307f., 369-373, 381-387, 415-423, 428-449 and 451f. 
286 Vogel, E, «Siyàsa» iii, in: Ef, IX, 694-6, and Tyan, «Méthodologie et sources du droit en 
Islam», Studia Islámica X (1959), 79-109, esp. 101-6. 
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